Unfair Credit Agreements
The problem seems to lie in the fact that the previous case confused the unfair test under the unfair terms of the Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (now Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015) with the abuse test. The test applies to both regulated and unregulated credit contracts, and the court has broad discretion in deciding whether to make a decision to “take into account all the issues it deems relevant.” Sections 77, 78 and 79 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 set out the information that creditors must provide to debtors in the context of fixed-term and ongoing account and lease contracts. According to these sections, a debtor can pay $1: In 2014, Plevin v. Paragon Personal Finance Ltd found that it was not necessary for the lender to breach a obligation to the borrower before the relationship could be considered unfair . The Supreme Court again addressed the issue of unfair relations with respect to false sales of PPI. In particular, the Tribunal considered the non-disclosure of commissions payable through a PPI premium if the lender had not breached ICOB rules. Prior to Plevin, the finding of an unfair relationship was based on the standard imposed by regulatory authorities under their legal obligations . Plevin considered this basis in the broader context of the commercial behaviour expected by the creditor . This broader context now allows the Tribunal to examine the fairness or abuse of the banking relationship in circumstances in which the lender has fulfilled its obligations to the borrower. Nugee J acknowledged that the exercise of an abusive relationship within the meaning of Section 140A CCA was not identical to the practice of the finding that a clause within the meaning of the 1999 unfair clauses in consumer contracts was abusive.
The question is whether the relationship is unfair and not whether a particular term is unfair. The court will focus on the relationship as a whole and not on whether the agreement itself was unfair. As a result, the court can verify the relationship between the lender and the borrower after the agreement is concluded, and the audit could cover the entire history of the bank report or credit report. If this information is not provided within 12 business days, the liability will no longer be applicable. This means that Sections 140A and 140B of the Consumer Credit Act give courts broad powers to protect borrowers from unfair relationships with lenders under fully regulated and exempt credit contracts. The fact that in Chubb, the interest rate was clear and not buried in the fine print, that borrowers knew what they were doing and that they were legally informed that they were intelligent consumers and that they were not fooled, Nugee J appeared precisely as the kind of considerations that might be relevant, among other things, to determining whether a fixed term of a loan contract would render unfair the relationship between lenders and borrowers. In Chubb, an interest rate of 1.85%, plus a tax of 1.25% per month, was maintained as a difficult but not unfair bargain. Nugee J. also referred to arguments that the judge had justified his decision that the interest rate was not unfair, on Chubb and Bruce versus Dean-Anor  EWHC 1282 (Ch), which preceded the Plevin Supreme Court decision. In 2006, the Consumer Credit Act (“CCA 2006”) came into effect, which amended the Consumer Credit Act in 1974. It relates to credit contracts concluded after April 6, 2007 or agreements that had not been repaid by a borrower before that date. With the introduction of the new legislation, consumers should be given better protection to remedy the abuse of consumer credit contracts between a lender and a borrower.